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THE CLASSICAL CONSTITUTION AND
THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION:
SEPARATED AT BIRTH
Suzanna Sherry*
I. PRELIMINARIES
Richard Epstein's new book' is classic Epstein: erudite, eclectic,
and unconventional to the point of being revolutionary. It is filled
with blunt pronouncements, flashes of brilliance, and a characteris-
tic willingness to criticize even political allies. But in the end, it fails
in its mission to resurrect and defend the American constitutional
landscape as it existed before 1937.
The Classical Liberal Constitution presents an intricate and com-
prehensive theory of our Constitution. Weaving together text, histo-
ry, political philosophy, and economics, Epstein envisions a radical-
ly different constitution that sharply limits government power -
especially at the federal level -and provides strong protection for
* Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Han-
nah Edelman for information and sources on developmental biology.
I RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014).
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certain limited categories of individual rights. He would increase
protection for broad property-related rights that are mostly unfash-
ionable in post-New Deal American political and judicial culture.
On the other hand, he would both excise from constitutional protec-
tion, and deprive Congress of the authority to protect, many of the
privacy and equality based rights of which the modem Supreme
Court has been most solicitous.
At first glance, Epstein's imposing edifice appears internally
coherent and almost impregnable despite its novelty. His core in-
sight is that our Constitution, designed as it was by a generation
mistrustful of both democratic governance and government power,
was focused largely on preventing majorities from enacting wealth
transfers, creating monopolies, or forcing cross-subsidization of
some individuals or entities by others. It is a Constitution that pro-
tects only negative rights -the right to be free from government
interference - and protects them especially strongly from govern-
ment attempts to infringe them in the name of creating positive
rights for, or transfer payments to, other citizens.
This fundamental limitation on government power does most
of the practical work in Epstein's classical liberal constitution. When
it comes to the interlinked rights of property, contract, and associa-
tion, he sees most government regulation as an illicit attempt to en-
rich some at the expense of others and therefore as presumptively
unconstitutional. Such regulations are justified only if they fall
within the police power, which Epstein construes narrowly as cov-
ering "matters of safety, health, general welfare, and morals of the
community." 2 Thus labor regulations, anti-discrimination laws, ag-
ricultural subsidies, and all manner of other government interfer-
2 d. at 304.
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ences with the operation of the free market are unequivocally un-
constitutional.3
Epstein contrasts his classical liberal constitution with what he
labels the "progressive" constitution. The progressive constitution-
alist mistrusts the free market and views government regulation as
a "positive force for good" and thus as presumptively constitution-
al. 4 Although Epstein sometimes seems to mistake the United States
for Sweden - he describes our government as one that creates "enti-
tlements (as opposed to mere rights) to housing, health care, educa-
tion, or jobs" 5 -his progressive constitution is, by and large, the
Constitution as interpreted by the post-1937 Court.
He defends his choice of the classical constitution over the pro-
gressive one largely on historical and political-economic grounds. It
is, he argues, both the Constitution envisioned by the Founding
generation and the Constitution that would produce (and did pro-
duce, when it was in effect) the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber of Americans.
I am not foolish enough to argue economics or political theory
with Richard Epstein, at least not in public. But I can, and do, quar-
rel with both his descriptive history and the conclusions he draws
See, e.g., id. at 16 ("Modem social democratic outlook," unlike classical liberal
outlook, expands police power to interests such as "the equalization of wealth and
the elimination of private forms of (invidious) discrimination"); id. at 42 ("classical
liberal solutions . . . keep public hands off voluntary transactions in labor, capital,
goods, or services"); id. at 170 (NLRA "created labor cartels"); id. at 178 (criticizing
Wickard v. Filburn, "because the state-run cartel is the problem, not the solution, to
the general question of agricultural production"); id. at 179-80 (criticizing the 1964
Civil Rights Act, "especially in the area of employment").
4 Id. at 6.
s Id. at 35. See also id. at 55 ("The modem progressives have a much larger list
[than classical liberals] of alleged state interests . . ., including the provision of mini-
mum standards of wealth or happiness for all citizens, restraints on the distribution
of wealth more generally, and often a full array of positive entitlements, some of
which may even have constitutional weight.").
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from it. His generalized description of the Founding generation as
manifesting both a "deep ambivalence toward state power" 6 and an
"overt hostility to democratic institutions"7 is accurate and too often
overlooked by modem scholars, including both conservative
originalists and progressive popular constitutionalists. But the devil
is in the details, and Epstein too often gets the details wrong.
In this short essay, I will focus on two issues about which some
combination of mistaken historical analysis, misunderstanding of
the nature of the judicial role, and misapplication of his own politi-
cal theory leads Epstein to exactly the wrong conclusions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
Ironically, one of the most fundamental mistakes in Epstein's
description of constitutional structure is actually an obstacle to his
preferred interpretation of the Constitution.8 The thrust of his book
is that the Supreme Court has too often deferred to legislative ma-
jorities and too seldom invalidated government invasions of classi-
cal liberal rights. Looking back over the Supreme Court's history, he
concludes that "[t]he horrific decisions all come from the unwill-
ingness to respect the equal rights of all persons or the limitations
on federal powers" 9 -in other words, from judicial abdication ra-
ther than judicial boldness. Bravo!10
But the way he characterizes judicial review makes it much
harder for him to defend it: He mischaracterizes it as "judicial su-
6 Id. at 18.
7 Id. at 28.
8 It is also widely shared, by both conservative and progressive scholars.
9 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 79.
1o See Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More judicial Activism in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
EXECUTIVE POWER, AND POPULAR ENLIGHTENMENT (Giorgi Areshidze, Paul Carrese,
and Suzanna Sherry eds., forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssm.com/abs
tract=2213372; see also Richard Epstein, In Praise of Suzanna Sherry and Judicial Activ-
ism, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 443, 445-46 (2013) (taking issue with my list of worst cases).
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premacy" as opposed to "judicial parity."" That mischaracteriza-
tion leads him to conclude that such supremacy was not contem-
plated by the original Constitution,12 and thus requires him to en-
gage in elaborate argumentation about why we should nevertheless
endorse it because of both its benefits and its pedigree.1 This, of
course, raises the obvious question about why we should not simi-
larly endorse the post-New Deal constitution -which is now 75
years old and has produced one of the strongest economic and po-
litical powers on the planet-a question he never satisfactorily an-
swers.
In fact, our current system of judicial review is best described as
judicial parity, not judicial supremacy. Courts are the final arbiter of
the Constitution only to the extent that they hold a law unconstitu-
tional, and even then only because they act last in time, not because
their will is supreme. The branches are co-equal when it comes to
constitutional interpretation. Each branch makes an independent
decision as to the constitutionality of a proposed government ac-
tion, but all three branches must agree that a law (or other govern-
ment action) is constitutionally permissible in order for it to be val-
id. If Congress believes that a proposed law is unconstitutional it
will choose not to enact that law, and no other branch can override
Congress's decision. If the President believes that a proposed law is
unconstitutional, he will veto it, and his view can be overridden
only with difficulty (and only by the legislative branch). Judicial
review simply ensures that the judiciary has the same opportunity
as the other two branches to prevent the government as a whole
from acting unconstitutionally. Thus the Court is not unique in its
power: A decision by any branch that a particular governmental
1 See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 77-97.
12 See id. at 80-87.
13 See id. at 97-100.
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action is unconstitutional will block that action from occurring. The
parity of the branches can be illustrated from the other direction as
well: If the Supreme Court finds something to be constitutional, that
holding is not binding on the other branchesl 4- just as a legislative
(or executive) determination that a particular action is constitutional
is not binding on the Court.
Indeed, an argument can be made that the conventional prac-
tice of judicial review puts the Court in a position of inferiority vis-
A-vis the other two branches. The legislature and the executive can
stymie government action for any reason or no reason at all -and
need not even explain themselves. The Court, however, can invali-
date a law only on the ground that it violates the Constitution. The
more narrowly we define the attribute of unconstitutionality, the
less power the Court has. Thus conventional accounts strip the
Court of power by minimizing the constitutional provisions that
might give courts more discretion: examples include the Slaughter-
house Cases' evisceration of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
or Immunities Clause, 15 the pejorative labeling of the Ninth
Amendment as an "inkblot," 1 6 and progressive and conservative
14 For example, despite the Supreme Court's holding in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that the National Bank was constitutional, the popular
branches continued to spar over the question, and ultimately the Bank's charter was
discontinued. See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT GOD HATH WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 373-86 (2007); ROBERT V. REMINI,
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR (1967); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS IN POLITICS IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957).
15 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
16 See The Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1001'
Cong., 249 (Part I) (statement of Robert H. Bork, Judge, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990) (describing Privileges or
Immunities Clause as an "inkblot").
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attacks on "substantive due process" for its role in, respectively,
Lochner v. New York17 and Roe v. Wade.'8
Epstein, to his credit, does not fall into the trap of denigrating
the importance of these clauses.19 But his tendency to let modem
critics of broad judicial power set the agenda blinds him to a histor-
ical account that would bolster his ultimate preference for a strong
judiciary. He fails to notice that early judicial invalidations were
effectively not constrained to interpreting and applying the written
Constitution. Judges -state and federal, from before the adoption of
the 1787 Constitution until after the Civil War - often invalidated
both state and federal laws for inconsistency with unwritten natural
law or unenumerated natural rights.20 Although still not as unlim-
ited as legislative or executive authority, judicial discretion was
once broader than it is today.
Thus Epstein begins with counterproductive mistakes that he
then has to overcome. And those mistakes are representative of the
presentist approach that undermines his historical analysis. Rather
than starting with the history and drawing conclusions from it, he
appears to start from the conclusions and try to fit the - admittedly
messy and often inconclusive -history to it. Two quick examples
illustrate his tendency to ignore inconvenient historical details.
First, his insistence on a narrow interpretation of the Commerce
Clause relies heavily on the fact that Congress's powers are specifi-
17 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 370-71, 372, 527-29 (discussing the Ninth
Amendment, substantive due process, and Privileges or Immunities Clause respec-
tively).
20 For descriptions of this phenomenon, see Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwrit-
ten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the
States, 61 U. CINCINNATI L. REv. 171 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradi-
tion of Extra-Textual Interpretation, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF STATE PROTECTIONS OF LIBERTY 157 (Paul Finkel-
man & Stephen E. Gottlieb, eds., 1991).
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cally enumerated. 2' What he fails to recognize is that the enumera-
tion of legislative powers was a very late-and undiscussed-
choice by the Committee on Detail, not a considered decision by the
body of the Constitutional Convention.22 It thus cannot bear the
weight he puts on it. 2
A second example is found in his discussion of the appellate
power of the Supreme Court under Article III. He argues that be-
cause all of the cases listed in Article III "arise in the lower federal
courts," Article III confers no Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over decisions by state courts. 24 Under the original Constitution,
then, "there are some cases in which the Supreme Court cannot
hear a constitutional matter"25 and the document "strips the Su-
preme Court of its distinctive powers to invalidate both federal and
state legislation." 26 Unfortunately, he misses an important historical
point: The Constitution leaves the establishment of the lower feder-
21 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 12 ("The basic constitutional plan limited the
legislative power of Congress to certain listed or 'enumerated' categories"); id. at 148
("The common public understanding of the term 'enumerated' suggests that some
activities must necessarily lie outside the enumeration").
2 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 203-08 (3d ed. 2013).
23 The oversight is especially glaring when he castigates Justice Ginsburg for at-
tributing to the Commerce Clause a power to legislate "for the general interests of
the Union," because, he argues, the document she misquotes actually confers that
power on "the Legislature"; the legislature, he says, "has all sorts of enumerated
powers." EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 189-90. But that document - an early draft of the
Constitution - long predates the enumeration of powers. Compare 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, pp. 131-32, para. 8 (M. Farrand rev. 1966) (Proceed-
ings of the Convention July 19-July 23) (cited by Ginsburg and Epstein) with FARBER
& SHERRY, supra note 22, at 633 (Committee on Detail Draft, presented August 6).
24 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 96.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 97. He rectifies this by incorporating judicial review into the Constitution
by prescription-that is, by long usage that makes the original flawed Constitution
more consistent with the Founders' idealized classical liberal constitution. See gener-
ally id. at 97-100 (defending judicial review as the correct "prescriptive approach to
judicial power").
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al courts to the discretion of Congress precisely on the assumption
that without lower federal courts, state courts could and would
(and indeed were required to) entertain the cases listed in Article
111.27
Epstein's historical analysis of the eighteenth century is thus
problematic. But he fares little better when it comes to nineteenth-
and twentieth-century history. In at least one instance, these failures
lead him to misapply his own political theory about exactly what it
is that the classical liberal constitution should and should not do. In
the next section, I argue that a constitution based on respecting clas-
sical liberal rights and preventing governmental wealth transfers
would, contrary to Epstein's assertions, invalidate laws prohibiting
abortion.
III. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Given Epstein's narrow conception of the police power, his mis-
trust of government motives, and his wish for more judicial invali-
27 See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
71 (Adrienne Koch ed. 1966) (June 5) (quoting John Rutledge of South Carolina op-
posing the mandatory creation of lower federal courts, on the ground that "the State
Tribunals might and ought to be left to decide in the first instance[,] the right of ap-
peal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights
and uniformity of Judgments"). For additional historical support for the conclusion
that state courts may hear, and the Supreme Court may review, cases listed in Article
III, see, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Julian Velasco, Con-
gressional Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46
CATH. U. L. REV. 671 (1997); see also Michael Collins, The Federal Courts, The First Con-
gress, and the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515 (2005) (arguing that some-
but not all -Art. III cases were meant to be excluded from state court jurisdiction);
James Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction Stripping, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191 (2007) (arguing that history suggests
Congress may constitute state tribunals as inferior tribunals by assigning them juris-
diction over Art. III cases).
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dations in the service of protecting individual rights, one might ex-
pect him to support Roe v. Wade28 and its progeny. After all, by in-
validating state laws against early abortions, Roe protected individ-
uals from government interference in their private decisions, much
as Epstein wants the courts to do for decisions involving contract or
association. Indeed, as he recognizes, the same concept of substan-
tive due process that underlies Lochner (which he strongly supports)
also underlies Roe.29
Epstein, however, contends that abortion is different. It is with-
in the police power to regulate -despite its curtailment of a wom-
an's freedom-because it protects the life of "the unborn child."30
Roe and Lochner are distinguishable because the "health and safety
heads of the police power have real purchase in the context of abor-
tion" that they did not in Lochner. 31 Thus, he concludes, "the classi-
cal liberal position [does] not point in favor of a woman's right to
have an abortion." 32
One obvious problem here is Epstein's ipse dixit that the fetus is
a person whose life and health are of concern to the state. His only
argument in support of that conclusion is his misleading statement
that "conception is the only sharp break in the continuous process
of reproduction," which, according to Epstein, makes Roe's rejection
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For Epstein's support of Lochner,
see EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 338-39; for his recognition of the underlying similarity
between Lochner and Roe, see id. at 372.
3 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 78.
31 Id. at 372.
32 Id. He ultimately concludes that "the fact that abortion has been entrenched for
over thirty-nine years, now with a clear majority of public support," means that we
should not overrule Roe and risk "enormous disruption." Id. at 375. One wonders
why he does not reach the same conclusion with regard to the fifty-year-old Civil
Rights Act, to say nothing of the seventy-six-year-old New Deal Constitution. Per-
haps he recognizes the existence of some sacred cows after all.
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of fetal personhood a "verbal evasion[]."33 But implantation of the
fertilized egg,34 which fails naturally in a large number of cases in
which fertilization has taken place,35 is at least as likely a candidate.
One is also hard pressed to consider fertilization the "only sharp
break" when at the time of fertilization it is not possible to know
even how many "persons" have been created: Identical twins are
created from a single fertilized egg. 36 Once we recognize that there
may be several different obvious breaks, it is less clear that viability
should not be considered one of them. Indeed, biologists have iden-
tified at least "four stages of development . . . as the point where
human life begins": fertilization, gastrulation (after which twinning
is no longer possible), EEG activation (human brainwave pattern),
and viability.37 Epstein's use of basic developmental biology, in
short, is even more suspect than his use of history.
But the bigger problem is that Epstein seems entirely unaware
that state restrictions on abortion were not originally motivated by
concerns about fetal (or maternal) life or health. They were in fact
enacted for exactly the sort of monopoly-creating, wealth-
transferring reasons that he so condemns in the context of govern-
ment restrictions on property, contract, and association.
3Id. at 373.
34I assume that by "conception," he means fertilization. He describes Roe as ex-
cluding "a fertilized egg" from the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, id.,
apparently equating the two terms.
3 See, e.g., A.T. Hertig et al., Thirty-Four Fertilized Human Ova, Good, Bad and Indif-
ferent, Recovered from 210 Women of Known Fertility: A Study of Biologic Wastage in Early
Human Pregnancy, 23 PEDIATRICS 202, 211 (1959) ("The greatest ovular loss is in the
preimplantation stage"); K. Diedrich et al., The Role of the Endometrium and Embryo in
Human Implantation, 13 HuM. REPROD. UPDATE 365, 366 (2007) ("The majority of
spontaneous human conceptions fail to complete implantation.").
36 See, e.g., ScoTrt F. GILBERT, DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 304-09 (10th ed. 2014).
37 Scort F. GILBERT ET. AL, BIOETHICS AND THE NEW EMBRYOLOGY: SPRINGBOARDS
FOR DEBATE 40-41 (2005).
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At the time of the adoption of the Constitution and throughout
most of the nineteenth century, abortion before quickening38 was
common, legal, and generally not viewed as immoral.39 Newspa-
pers-including family and religious newspapers -often printed
advertisements for discreetly described abortion services and abor-
tifacients. 40 State courts regularly dismissed criminal charges or or-
dered retrials when it could not be shown that quickening had oc-
curred before the defendant induced an abortion.41
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the newly
formed American Medical Association and its university-trained
doctor members began lobbying for restrictions on early-term abor-
tion. They did so primarily for anti-competitive reasons: to drive
everyone else out of the medical business. These elite doctors faced
stiff competition from other medical practitioners, but there were
not yet licensing schemes to prevent midwives, folk practitioners,
faith healers, and other untrained individuals from practicing med-
icine. Doctors needed a way to distinguish themselves from these
other medical practitioners. As one scholar puts it, in terms eerily
similar to Epstein's condemnation of most federal regulation of
economic activities:
3 Quickening is the ability of the mother to feel the fetus kicking, and occurs in
the latter half of the second trimester.
3See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLrICS OF MOTHERHOOD 13-14, 18-20
(2008); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY 3-16 (1978); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
ABSOLUTES 28-29 (1990).
40 LUKER, supra note 39, at 18-19.
41 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204 (1879); Evans v. People, 1 Cow.
Cr. Rep. 494 (N.Y. 1872); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Clarke 274 (Iowa 1856); State v.
Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (N.J. 1849); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263
(1845); Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 387 (1812). See also Filber v. Dau-
termann, 26 Wis. 518 (1870) (reaffirming quickening doctrine in a non-criminal con-
text); Smith v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45 (1857) (same).
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Nineteenth-century physicians needed to be "better" than
their competition in order to persuade the public that li-
censing laws were not simply a self-serving "restraint of
trade," designed only to raise the price of a doctor's bill by
eliminating the competition .... Because they could offer
no direct, easily observable, and dramatic proof of their su-
periority, regular physicians were forced to make an indi-
rect symbolic claim about their status. By becoming visible
activists on an issue such as abortion, they could claim both
moral stature (as a high-minded, self-regulating group of
professionals) and technical expertise (derived from their su-
perior training). 42
In the words of another scholar, "the medical profession was at-
tempting to establish itself as a profession, and graduates of elite
medical schools ('regulars') were attempting to drive competing
popular practitioners ('irregulars') from the field." 43 The anti-
abortion agenda as a way to raise the status - and remuneration - of
some groups continued well into the twentieth century, used by
obstetricians and gynecologists first to distinguish themselves from
other doctors and then to campaign against midwives."
Although physicians of the time claimed to be taking a moral
stand, their actions are much more consistent with an attempt to
control the field than with an attempt to outlaw an immoral prac-
tice. They urged legislatures to adopt laws that "would forbid non-
42 LUKER, supra note 39, at 28-31.
4 Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regula-
tion and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 283 (1992); see also LESLIE J.
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 82 (1997) ("Nineteenth-century Regulars had fought
abortion as part of a larger campaign to wrest control over medical practice from
competing sects.").
4 See REAGAN, supra note 43, at 82, 90-92.
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physicians to perform abortions but would give physicians a great
deal of legal discretion to perform abortions when they wanted
to."45 These new laws generally permitted "therapeutic" abortions,
and outspokenly anti-abortion physicians interpreted "therapeutic"
extremely broadly; some even opposed legislative attempts to tight-
en restrictions on "therapeutic" abortions performed by physi-
cians.46
Thus regulation of early-term abortions followed the same pat-
tern - albeit half a century earlier - that Epstein identifies for regu-
lation of economic rights, such as wage-and-hour legislation limit-
ing freedom of contract. Under the common law, there was no regu-
lation and individuals were free to act as they liked. One group de-
cided that it would be in their own economic interest to restrict the
right, and used health and safety arguments as a pretext to per-
suade legislatures to enact laws that created cartels and blocked
competition.
And there is one additional ironic similarity. In Epstein's view,
progressives have pulled the wool over the eyes of the American
public (to say nothing of the Supreme Court) in disguising the sor-
did rent-seeking nature of labor laws, civil rights laws, and the rest.
The AMA and its right-to-life successors, however, have apparently
pulled the wool over Epstein's eyes. He argues that abortion regula-
tions are based on health and safety, and then asks rhetorically
"[w]hy ignore the strong historical spread of abortion laws starting
in the nineteenth century?" 47 No one who is both familiar with that
history and opposed to government wealth transfers would ask
such a question.
4 LUKER, supra note 39, at 32.
4 Id. at 33-34.
4 EPSrEIN, supra note 1, at 374.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Epstein wisely eschews creating constitutional doctrine on
purely abstract political theory. Instead, he uses the Constitution's
text and history to create the context in which he can develop his
more grounded political theory. Unfortunately, he often gets the
historical context wrong. 4 And once that foundation is under-
mined, the whole edifice crumbles.
In the end, The Classical Liberal Constitution is the latest in a long
line of scholarly works that attempt to create a grand theory of con-
stitutional law. 49 Like many of its predecessors, it is elegant and fun
to read. But also like its predecessors, it seems designed more to
achieve certain results-to legitimate some cases and undermine
others - than to describe an intellectually or historically sound ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation across the board. Those who
do not agree with Epstein's judgments about which cases are right
and which are wrong are unlikely to be persuaded by either the
historical analysis or the political theorizing that just happens to
coincide with those judgments.
48 Bertrand Russell's description of Hegel's historical theory seems equally appli-
cable to Epstein's: "It was an interesting thesis [but] [1]ike other historical theories, it
required, if it was to be made plausible, some distortion of facts and considerable
ignorance." BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 735 (1945) (141h
cloth edition 1964).
49 Some of the best of the genre include JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) and BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN: WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2014). For a critique of "grand theory" in general, see DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).
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